within the physical environment, and (2) the portions of the causal chains within the organism. We will discuss the environmental portions first. In each case, variables not located at (that is to say, not defined in terms of) the boundary between organism and environment will be used as examples in order to make explicit the characteristic entanglements within the causal texture of the regions in question. As far as the environment is concerned, one will have to start from the socalled 'distal' stimulus-or effect-variables as reference points and study their relationships to the proximal (or boundary-) variables.
On the perception side, an example of a distal variable is the distance of objects. Causal chains determined by distance will, on their way into the organism, exert certain proximal effects, or criteria, upon the sensory surface of the organism. The most important feature of the general relationship between distal and proximal stimulus variables is its lack of univocality.
Firstly, there is ambiguity in the direction from cause to effect. Inventories of possible 'cues for third-dimensional distance' have been compiled from the beginnings of psychological inquiry. Current textbooks list something like ten depth criteria, such as binocular parallax, convergence of the eye axes, accommodation, linear and angular perspective, interception of far objects by near objects, atmospheric effects, number of in-between objects, vertical position. The list could be extended considerably further. The necessity for becoming so involved derives from the fact that none of these proximal variables can be considered to be the distance cue in the sense of an effect which would be present without exception whenever the distal condition should obtain. Some of the cues will more often, others less often, be present, depending on circumstances, and occasionally all of them may be cut off (so that the fact of a certain distance relationship must remain unrecognized by the organism in question).
Secondly, there also is ambiguity in the reverse direction, that is to say, from effect to cause. A certain proximal stimulus feature, such as binocular parallax, may ordinarily be due to differences in depth, but it could occasionally as well be caused by an artificial setup of two flat pictures in a stereoscope. Or, the characteristic trapezoidal shape of retinal images constituting the depth criterion of perspective may frequently be due to distortion of rectangular objects seen under an angle, i.e., extending into the third dimension; but it may also be due to an actual trapezoidal object in a frontal position with all of its points at the same distance from the eye.
On the environmental portion of the effect side, the relationships between objects and cues are replaced, in a symmetrical fashion, by the relationships between means and ends, or between proximal actions or habits and distal results. Examples showing the ambiguity of these ^relationships in both causal directions could easily be given in analogous fashion to the ones discussed above for the perception side.
Generally speaking, both the object-cue and the means-end relationship are relations between probable partial causes and probable partial effects. Thereby the entire universe of the living conditions of the organism or species in question might well be taken as a 'reference class' defining a 'population' of situations. Then there is a good chance that distance as a distal variable will cause distance cues, and that the so-called distance cues have been actually caused by distance, but it will by no means be necessarily so. We use the term 'partial' (cause or effect) since the members of the causal chain are in every particular instance determined by a large number of other relevant conditions. Cues as well as means can be ranked into 'hierarchies' in accordance with the degree of probability by which they are linked, in both causal directions, to the respective distal variables, and classified accordingly .as 'good,' 'misleading,' etc. (13).
This brings us to the second point, the contributions of the organism. Survival and its sub-units, which may be defined as the establishment of stable interrelationships with the environment, are possible only if the organism is able to establish compensatory balance in the face of comparative chaos within the physical environment. Ambiguity of cues and means relative to the vitally relevant objects and results must find its counterpart in an ambiguity and flexibility of the proximal-peripheral mediating processes in the organism. This pattern contrasts somewhat with the relatively specific focussing of vital processes upon the central-organismic and the distal-environmental variables. Thus each class-of behavioral achievement may be represented, when telescoped into a composite picture covering extended periods of time, by a bundle of light rays passing through a convex lens from one focus to another, with a scattering of the causal chains in the mediating layers. Most objective psychologists who have made efforts to find a formal criterion by which behavior could be delimited from non-behavior have in various forms resorted to something amounting to such a lens analogy. Examples are Tolman's "persistence and docility of activity relative to some end" (12) as a criterion for purposiveness of behavior, Hunter's emphasis upon 'vicarious functioning' in defining the subject matter of a behavioristic psychology, Hull's emphasis upon such patterns as the 'habit family hierarchy' (6), some considerations put forward by Heider (5) , and generally the concept of 'equivalence' or of 'equipotentiality' of stimuli and of acts.
The point I should like to emphasize especially in this connection is the necessary imperfection, inflicted upon achievements-as relations between classes-by the ambiguity in the causal texture of the environment, which remains apparent as long as single variables, that is partial causes and partial effects, are considered under otherwise not specifically controlled conditions. Because of this environmental ambiguity, no matter how smoothly the organismic instruments and mechanisms may function, relationships cannot be foolproof, at least as far as those connecting with the vitally relevant more remote distal regions of the environment are concerned. This intrinsic lack of perfection, that is of univocality, will on the whole be the greater the more wide-spanning the relationships involved are. The only way in which perfection could be secured would be by control over all the remaining conditions which could possibly become relevant in the given case. This however is something the reacting organism cannot do for lack of time if not for other more serious reasons-and thus something which the psychologist who wishes to catch and rationally to reconstruct orgaiiismic adjustment at large, with all of its faults and fallacies, should also not do. All a finite, sub-divine individual can do when acting is-to use a term of Reichenbaeh (n)-to make a posit, or wager. The best he can do is to compromise between cues so that his posit approaches the 'best bet' on the basis of "all the probabilities, or past relative frequencies, of relevant interrelationships lumped together* One of the comparatively neglected tasks of a molar environmental psychology is to find out the extent to which environmental hierarchies of probabilities of object-cue as well as of means-end relationships do find a counterpart in similar hierarchies of evaluation by the organism, This would mean that the environmental probabilities be first ascertained for all of the cues or means involved, with, say, the 'normal' life conditions of the organism taken as the defining reference class. This part of the research would be strictly environmental and preparatory in character and would not involve any reference to organismic reaction. 2 Very little has thus far been done in the direction of such an environmental analysis.
The most conspicuous exception is a certain knowledge we have about the so called * physiognomic' relationships between certain .mental states or abilities in our fellow-men, and their external physical characteristics. Such studies have, however, been undertaken primarily because of an interest centering in questions of the expressiveness of human beings viewed as subjects rather than because of an interest in some other subject's social environment, and the problems confronting such a subject in his approach to objects of social perception. In effect, however, they have given us some information to be utilized for our purpose. The present writer has selected one of the few ascertained relationships found between ability and physique, namely the correlation of intelligence with height and with weight. To be sure, these correlations are extremely low, about .15, but this is all to the good, since many of the cues probably in use in perception are of such a low order of validity, including some of the lesser members of what may be called, in analogy to Hull's habit-family-hierarchy, the 'cuefamily-hierarchy' of the distance criteria listed on page 256. Social perceptual reactions to schematized drawings of human figures as well as to photographs which had been magnified, reduced, and distorted in height and width turned out to be more favorable with respect to apparent intelligence and other apparent personality characteristics in the case of taller and broader body builds (2, 14) . There thus may be intuitive responsiveness to social environmental correlations as low as .15 (though other possibilities of an explanation of the reactions, such as, e.g., a psychoanalytic one, would have yet to be tested). Furthermore, there are indications that height and weight contribute only little to the impressions made, when compared with other factors such as the face, etc. Such a finding, if verified, would be in line with what should be expected on the ground of a perceptual compromise principle, since cues of low validity would then have to be given little weight by the organism in establishing the best bet.
The writer is attempting an analysis of the environmental validities of the distance cues, present, absent, and misleading or contradictory, in a set of pictures selected from magazines by a group of subjects and thus probably fairly representative of interesting life situations. The hierarchy thus established in a preliminary way appeared to be on the whole in fair agreement with what can be inferred from results of experimental studies about the subjective weight of distance cues which had been made to conflict artificially in stimulus configurations presented through the stereoscope.
On the whole, only scattered recognition has been given to the fact that object-cue and means-end relationships do not hold with the certainty obtained in the nomothetic study of the so-called laws of nature, but are rather of the character of probability relationships. This deficiency is most clearly reflected in the psychology of learning which has proceeded almost exclusively along a dialectically dichotomized all-ornone pattern of 'correct vs. incorrect,' 'right vs. wrong.' Situations in which food can be found always to the right and never to the left, or always behind a black door and never behind a white one, are not representative of the structure of the environment, but are based on an idealized black-white dramatization of the world, somewhat in a Hollywood style. They are thus not sound as experimental devices from the standpoint of a psychology .which wishes to learn, above all other things, something about behavior under conditions representative of actual life. In an effort to imitate experimentally the tangled causal texture of the environment more closely than is customary, the writer tested a variety of ambiguous environmental means-end relationships, using rats as subjects (i). The rate of learning (which may be taken as an index of organismic weight given to the means of cue in question) was found to vary with the probability, that is to say; with the combination of relative frequencies, of the intraenvironmental relationships tested. II I have expanded on this subject to such an extent because I believe that the probability character of the causal (partial cause-and-effect) relationships in the environment calls for a fundamental, all-inclusive shift in our methodological ideology regarding psychology; To be sure, in the field of widespanning relationships of a predominantly historic-genetic type, such as of heredity and of individual differences in general, this shift occurred at the time of Galton and his followers who established correlation statistics as a particularly suitable means of quantitatively expressing ambiguous probability relationships. The relationships existing between organism and geographic environment at large will have to be approached in basically the same way. In any wide-spanning correlation, be it of historic or of geographic reference, there are a great many relevant variables and specific control is lacking for all of them except the two (or few), whose relationship is under specific consideration. Such a deliberate neglect of specific control of relevant variables is the most fundamental negative characteristic of the 'molar' approach. Not more than generalized control by which membership is established in a broader class (including care for proper sampling) is exerted over the remaining relevant variables. For example, in comparing parents' intelligence with children's intelligence, not more than the most general features of the upbringing of the children such as health, normality, etc., are taken into consideration, instrumental detail is neglected. The situation is quite similar, though not quite so drastic, when we become interested in how well, in a practical achievement sense, we can estimate distal variables such as distance, or sizes and physical colors of objects, under all the varying circumstances of distance, surroundings, illumination, etc. (perceptual constancies). What the experimentalist is used to calling 'isolation of a variable' is in all these cases incomplete to a quite shocking extent. No univocality, no relationship resembling a 'law' in the traditional strict sense of the word can be uncovered under such circumstances.
The present paper thus represents an attempt to show that psychology, as long as it wishes to deal with the vitally relevant molar aspects of adjustment and achievement, has to become statistical throughout, instead of being statistical where it seems hopeless to be otherwise, and cherishing the nomothetic ideals of traditional experimental psychology as far as relationships between geographic stimulus variables and response variables are concerned. The price which has to be paid for such a double standard is the limitation of stimulusresponse psychology to narrow-spanning problems of artificially isolated proximal or peripheral technicalities of mediation which are not representative of the larger patterns of life.
In particular, the extension of the principles of such an instrument as correlation statistics from individual differences to stimulus-response relationships involves, firstly, that instead of correlating two variables (e.g., different test performances), paired by being drawn from the same sample of individuals characterized in their structure and functioning only as members of a general reference population, one would: have to correlate two variables (namely, a set of stimulus values and a set of response values) paired by being drawn from the same sample of situations or tests, characterized merely as belonging to the class, or 'population,' of living conditions of a particular individual (or category or species). In short, individuals are replaced by situations or tasks (which is to be distinguished from the mere exchange of the role of individuals for tests as in Stephenson's 'inverted' correlation technique). The achievement of a single subject, or even of a single subject in a certain particular attitude, could then be represented by a correlation coefficient based on a variety of test situations involving the stimulus -variable in question.
To make the analogy complete, one would, secondly, have to insist on representative sampling of situations or tests, just as in the field of individual differences one has to insist on the representative sampling of individuals from a population to ascertain at least some kind of generality for the, result. Proper sampling of subjects is thus replaced by proper sampling of objects or objectives. For general adjustment this would mean a randomization of tasks, a sampling of tests carefully drawn from the universe of the requirements a person happens to face in his commerce with the physical or social environment, as the defining class. For adjustment to, or cognitive attainment of, a single stimulus variable, such as distance, one would have to secure perceptual estimates of distance in a set of situations representative of all the situations and conditions in life which require judgment of, or adjustment to, distance. For each subject, this particular type of perceptual achievement could be represented by the correlation coefficient between measured distances and estimated distances. The more molecular pattern of traditional laboratory experimentation could thus be rounded out to include its molar counterpart, that is an achievement analysis deliberately neglecting the details, even if these details should be relevant in connection with one or the other member of the family of processes mediating this achievement, .
-. -An example of the application of the correlation technique to a stimulus response problem can be found in studies on social perceptual achievement, e.g., when intelligence is to be judged from photographs. Since in typical research :of this kind the photographs are not analyzed with respect to their geometric characteristics, the investigation bridges over the mediating layers altogether, in contrast to the purely intraenvironmental problems of physiognomies discussed above. It is characteristic of the traditional attitude of psychology that in these studies the sampling problem of social objects has rarely been given due consideration, both regarding sufficient number of social objects as well as the representative character of the sample. And this in spite of the fact that we usually find a sufficient and representative sample of subjects or judges.
On the whole, social perceptual problems have been rooted in the applied disciplines which have not come in toOidose a contact with the ideology of the 'exact' experimental laboratory psychology and thus have been more openminded to statistics from the beginning. As a methodological demonstration rather than with the purpose of fact finding, the present author has recently undertaken a study in perceptual size constancy in which the correlation technique was applied to a traditional academic stimulus-response problem. Proper sampling was attempted, and an effort was made to throw some light upon the traditional mediation problems of proximal stimulation, besides approaching the achievement problem (3). Purposely, one subject only was used. The person was interrupted frequently during her normal daily activities and asked,to estimate the size of the object she just happened to be looking at. Measurements of the object-sizes, which were the distal stimulus variable under consideration, and of their distances from the subject were also taken in each case. -These measurements made it possible to compute the relative^sizes of the retinal images as well which constituted the most outstanding feature of the mediating proximal stimulus patterns. Estimates of size were found to correlate with object measurements much more closely (between .95 and almost ixx>, depending on method of evaluation, with naive perceptual attitude) than with retinal stimulus size (between .2 and .7). This result indicates the selective focussing of the organism's response on the distal rather than the proximal variable. In contrast to most experimental studies this result possesses a certain generality with regard to normal life conditions. It furthermore suggests that focussing of psychology upon the proximal and peripheral layer is not the most fruitful thing to do and may lead to an out-of-focus, sterile type of research.
In short, the notion will have to be revised that, while the psychology of individual differences deals with correlations (at least de facto), experimental psychology of the stimulus response type deals with, or should strive toward, the uncovering of'laws'in the strict sense of the word.
As Mises (9) has pointed out, law finding and the molecular, microscopic approach are inseparably tied together. In a strict sense, the laws of nature have to be formulated as differential equations, yielding a relationship of the variables in question within an infinitesimally small spatio-temporal region. Their customary macroscopic form is the result of a mathematical integration over time or space, an extension which tacitly implies a number of assumptions about the intervening conditions. Such conditions may be controlled in a sufficiently specific manner in an experiment in which either the possibilities of interference are limited (such as in an optical experiment) and can easily be surveyed, or where the span between the independent and the dependent variable is relatively small in space and time. In this sense the laws of nature are not extremely general, but extremely specific.
Ill
The tie between the nomothetic and the microscopic attitude is reflected not only in traditional experimental psychology, but also in those more recent endeavors which stress law finding in psychology. The two most outstanding of these attempts are represented by Lewin and Hull. I agree with Lewin when he makes it clear that there is no place for statistics in a strictly nomothetic, or, as he calls it, systematic discipline (8) . In fact, not even averages from a large number of cases or repeated observations are in order.
Indeed, those psychologists who have accepted the ideology of accumulated observation have already deviated from the strictly nomothetic path. If all the relevant conditions are known, or rather if all disturbing influences are eliminated, only one observation is needed to ascertain a general law once and forever. Lewin calls this the technique of the 'pure case' and refers to Galileo's study of falling bodies as an example. In an attempt to apply his principles, Lewin has, however, paid the price of an 'encapsulation' of his psychology, at least insofar as theoretical structure is concerned, into what may be called the central layer of the personality. The 'field' within which Lewin is able to predict, in the strict sense of the word, is the person in his life space. But the life space is not to be confused with geographic environment of physical stimuli, nor with actually achieved results in the environ'ment. It is postperceptual, and pre-behavioral. It represents a cross section in time; yet, in spite of its cross-sectional-or, rather., actualistic-character, it is not considered static (as seems to be, for example, Titchener's old structuralism) but rather dynamic since events are defined as starting points for action. Whether or not, and in which way, action is carried out seems, however, a matter of secondary importance to Lewin. Thus no criterion for directedness of action which would be comparable to, say, Tolman's objective criteria for purposiveness of behavior, are explicitly worked out, and predictions can thus in a strict sense of the word not be tested. Furthermore, Lewinls inter-? est in preparation for action rather than action itself is reflected in his criticism of the use of the concept of achievement, and of the 'historic-geographic' conception of psychology in general, as contrasted with the systematic, nomothetic. All this is only another aspect of what has probably led to his rejection of statistical methods. (It is understood, I hope, that I am referring to the fundamental core and texture of Lewin's theoretical work only and not to his practices which represent a healthy synthesis of his theorizing and the established ways of checking on results.) Encapsulation into the central layer, with dynamicsJeading out of it, may be the least harmful of all the limitations which possibly could be imposed upon psychology: It may actually mean concentration upon the most essential phase in the entire process of life and of its ramifications. It may be the thing psychology has always been really after throughout its history. And there also is a 'dynamic' quality not only in the sense of reaching back to the object (as Brentano and James dreamed of) or forward to the goal (as Lewin undertakes to do) but also in the sense of giving full recognition to cross-sectional interaction within a larger whole, the central system. In his topological psychology, furthermore, Lewin has probably developed the most adequate conceptual tool for dealing with the central layer (which Brentano did not). Yet it is for this methodological perfection that he has paid the price of encapsulation, in that he has furnished but one reference point for all extrinsic dynamics and omitted checks on extrasystemic reference points and thus prevented the actual realization of a truly dynamic outlook. I should also like to refer to Hull's mathematico-deductive theory of rote learning, as a highly formalized systematic attempt in present day psychology (7). In spirit, the material used goes back to one of the classics of experimental psychology, namely to Ebbinghaus' studies of mechanical memory and thus to a rather elementaristic body of facts. Again the degree of nomothetic perfection which has been reached (though along a quite different line from that of Lewin) appears to be accompanied by a loss of inclusiveness or broadness of content. It is in concepts like that of the habit family hierarchy that Hull has reached the greatest approximation to fundamental structures of life, a fact which is compensated for by the use of a less highly developed systematic apparatus in this latter case.
Somewhat related though much more bound to traditional modes of thought is a large group of psychologists, represented, for example, by Pratt (10) , in whose opinion psychology cannot become truly scientific before it has resolved itself into more 'basic' disciplines such as physiology. The basic character of physiology is apparently given by the greater chances of dealing with laws in the strict sense, due to a more molecular character in the approach. Yet, as Woodworth (15) has pointed out, we have to realize that psychology is not a ' fundamental' discipline in this sense of the word.
What seems to be at the bottom of these tendencies is a certain halo effect regarding the concept of exactitude. The principle of methodological physicalism which defines the unity of the sciences should be understood to postulate intersubjective univocality of observation and of communication, not less, but also not more. This univocality is ascertained by the employment of measurement and of mathematical means of communication including such tools as topology. When Watson became the first great exponent of objectivity in psychology, the ideal of exactitude was pressed considerably beyond the purely methodological aspects of physicalism.
Thus, firstly, a point was made about the mechanistic character of psychology as contrasted with vitalistic notions. However, as Carnap has since emphasized, unity of method does not imply unity of laws (4) . Molar behaviorists of the present day, such as Tolman, have thus ceased worrying about the problem of explanatory teleology, for which psychology anyway does not seem to be the competent forum, nor capable of furnishing relevant material. 4 A second^ less conceptualized and thus more dangerous bias is based on the confusion between univocality of observation and communication, on the one hand, and the univocality of prediction. It is the latter which leads to the insistence upon law-finding in psychology. Thus, in addition to the mechanistic bias, we have the nomothetic bias, From the standpoint of methodological physicalism, however, a correlation coefficient is just as exact, that is to say, just as public and palpable in its.meaning as a law. And it has, it should be kept in mind, considerably more generality, and thus possibilities of prediction, than has an isolated single event such as those studied, in extreme instances, by historians and geographers. And, in a sense, it has even more generality than the 'general' laws of nature which are observed under such meticulously specified conditions.
Another element seems to enter here which may best be characterized by what Lewin (8) has called Aristotelian, as contrasted with Galilean, modes of thought (which, however, he himself has apparently failed to avoid in the instance to be referred to here). According to a .certain tradition, sciences fall into two categories, nomothetic, or law finding, and idiographic, or referring to individual events. It seems as if psychology would here and there still maintain an Aristotelian, that is to say, an all-or-none attitude toward this dichotomy; if we 'cannot have the general law, then let us escape into singularity! In a formal sense, however, imperfect correlations fill in the gap between law and isolated fact. Laws allow prediction with certainty, statistics (correlations) predictions with probability, 5 isolated facts allow no prediction at all (unless reference to laws or correlations is tacitly brought in such as in geography where a certain constancy of the crust of the earth is assumed, or in clinical psychology, where a certain consistency of character is anticipated).
The acceptance of ambiguity of prediction as a legitimate and general feature of psychological results will probably meet with the same resistance which logicians had to face when they proceeded from a dichotomous true-false alternative to multivalued logic, or which empirical scientists had to face when developing out of theological and metaphysical stages into the positive stage. 6 Yet, in establishing the methodological unity of science, it will become increasingly important to emphasize thematic differences. Only when diversity of topic and specific method within unity of general method is fully recognized will we be capable of carrying over the full richness of the psychological problems inherited from introspectionism and other preparatory stages into a thoroughly objectified system. Among the primary obstacles to be removed seem to be the confusions surr rounding the concept of exactitude, resulting in its over-expansion. There must be recognition of the fact that there can be no truly molar psychology dealing with the physical relationships of the organism with its environment unless at gives up the nomothetic ideal in favor of a thoroughly statistical conception. 7 In turn, the topical unity of psychology within the constitutional hierarchy of the sciences can be established by specifying, in terms of focal variables, width of >span, etc., the kinds of probability relationships maintained between the * Giving up the nomothetic ideal meets with emotional resistance quite comparable to the one encountered when other positions of security and mastery had to be given up in the course of 'Copernican revolutions' such as the dominant position of the earth within the universe, of man within the animal kingdom, or of the Ego within the system of human motivation. Thus one of the two major reasons, listed by Jaensch (until his recent death the most prominent figure of officially sanctioned contemporary German psychology) for the rejection of Gestalt psychology is the fact that Gestalt psychologists particularly emphasize ambiguity in perception, which is considered to be a frightening reflection of their own morbid psychic disposition. 7 It is in the difference in the use of statistics that we discover why psychology is not just simply " physics of the organism in its environment." The difference exists in spite of the recent emphasis upon the statistical nature of some of the most important sections of physics. It lies in the fact that non-univocality is in physics primarily confined to the 'microscopic' realm and appears to be eliminated, by the sheer weight of large numbeis, as long as we remain within phenomena of a macroscopic order. On the other hand, psychology is thoroughly infiltrated with statistics even in the macroscopic sphere, and in fact the more so the more macroscopic, or 'molar,' its problems become. It was indeed for the quantitative expression of one of the most widespanning types of relationships, that of inheritance, from generation to generation, of physical and mental characteristics, that correlation statistics were first introduced into the sciences of life. The reason for this introduction of statistics is that relationships on the whole tend to become less foolproof the wider the stretch, in ternU of spatiotemporal regions, over which they appear to be maintained. organism and its environment which are to be included within the scope of psychology.
In the end, this may not even mean a permanent renunciation of at least gradual approximation toward univocality of prediction. Techniques such as multiple correlation or analysis of variance, which consist essentially of a combination of correlations, will increasingly make it possible to narrow down prediction so that we will, at least in a practical sense, come closer and closer to the traditional scientific ideal, the isolation of variables and the establishment of general cause and effect relationships. If we are not to forget the teachings of Hume and John Stuart Mill, we must realize that there is nothing observed but concomitant variation-of greater or lesser relative frequency-and that all analysis of causal textures rests upon this foundation. 8 In an attempt to show that the'relationship'of the positions of the three speakers of the meeting was complementary rather than contradictory, the author tried to relate them to well-established disciplines. In visualizing the organism and the organism in its physical (geographical) environment, Lewin's approach seems to be confined to the life center of the organism which may be compared to the study of law and general policy of intra-governmental function in a society. There is indeed lawfulness and consistency within such a system, yet splendid isolation unless contact with other regions is maintained through information, on the one hand, and the executive arm, on the other. Of those external relationships, Hull 'seems primarily concerned with engineering problems, especially in his attempt to find basic elements such as conditioning to which more complex units could be reduced. Molar behaviorism, in its turn, with its concentration upon vitally relevant if remote historic or geographic variables such as maintenance schedule, time required to reach food, etc., appears in the position of the economist (and hence the term ecological psychology, mentioned above, seems not inappropriate for this kind of approach). An important difference, though one of secondary order, between the type of molar approach represented by Tolman and that proposed by the present writer is that the former seems to put much additional emphasis upon inferences regarding the intra-organismic 'intervening variables' (which brings him close to Lewin), e.g., a hunger drive as inferred from maintenance schedule; whereas the latter would tend, at least in principle, to discard for the moment intervening variables wherever they are not directly accessible. By representing an organism's or species' achievement system in terms of attained objects and results, such a psychology would in a sense be without the organism (i.t., would neglect all but a few focal details of organismic structure and intra-organismic processes), yet would let us know much about the organism (i.e., its relationships to the environment, in both cognition and action). By exerting actual measurement control mostly about stimuli and results, i.e., about historic or geographic variables, and about central variables only where a direct physiological approach is possible, such a psychology would be the direct counterpart to that represented by Lewin, Namely, it would not be post-perceptual and pre-behavioral, but rather perceptual and behavioral. But in the end, it seems that none of the various aspects just discussed can be dispensed with in a completely rounded-out system of psychology.
